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Trust and the Cost of Debt Financing 
 
 
 
Abstract  
 
This paper examines the relation between the level of trust in a country and the cost of debt. 
Using data on firms located in 22 countries over a 20-year period, we quantify the country 
trust level and find strong evidence that firms in countries with a higher level of societal trust 
have lower bond yield spreads. We also find that the impact of trust on the cost of debt is 
more pronounced in countries with a poor governance environment and during a time of 
financial crisis. Overall, our results highlight the role of social capital in shaping corporate 
financial behavior.  
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1. Introduction  
 
Capital is the resource that companies can use to generate profit and provide products to 
society. Both classical economics and the finance literature stress the importance of tangible 
assets and human capital. There is a large strand of studies that has looked at the process and 
efficiency of physical asset investment as well as the influence of human capital on 
productivity (Biddle et al., 2009; Ghaly et al., 2015; García Lara et al., 2016). A recent 
literature has also emerged that studies a firm’s intellectual capital – their investment in 
research and development (R&D). These studies not only look at firms’ decision in R&D 
investment input (Hall, 1993; Bushee, 1998; Aghion et al., 2013), but also look at the output 
of innovation obtained as the result of such investment (He and Tian, 2013; Hsu et al., 2014; 
Tian and Wang 2014). However, compared to the extensive studies on tangible, human, and 
intellectual capital, another type of capital – social capital, which is equally important as a 
source of production – has received much less attention (Servaes and Tamayo, 2017).  
 
Social capital contains different dimensions such as cooperative behavior, civic norms, and 
networking in the group, but trust is at its core (Hilary and Huang, 2015). The importance of 
such a notion has been expressed by different studies in different ways. For example, Arrow 
(1972) states that virtually every commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust, 
certainly any transaction conducted over a period of time", and this view is also supported by 
Williamson (1993). Fukuyama (1996) states that trust could enhance all institutions in a 
society, including business development and transactions. The central role of trust in social 
capital has attracted the attention of academics. Previous studies find that a higher level of 
trust is associated with higher economic growth (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Zak and Knack, 
2001), better financial development (Guiso et al., 2004), and a higher level of stock market 
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participation (Guiso et al., 2008) from a macroeconomic perspectives. However, the effect of 
trust on corporate financing has still been largely unexplored. 
 
This study intends to fill such a gap by looking at the effect of trust on the cost of debt 
issuance. We consider three related questions to clarify the role of trust on debt financing. 
The first question is: how, and to what extent, could trust be a factor that influences debt cost? 
Based on four reasons, we propose that trust could significantly reduce the financing cost of a 
firm. First, trust could reduce transactions cost in a society, which could increase the 
efficiency of business activities and therefore build a stronger economic foundation for debt 
repayment (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001). Second, trust could encourage 
market participation and funding availability. The increase in funding supply would lead to 
lower funding costs (Guiso et al, 2008a, 2008b; Duarte et al., 2012; Bottazzi et al., 2016). 
Third, trust among people improves the information flow of the market and therefore reduces 
the monitoring cost of creditors (Pevzner et al., 2015). Fourth, trust could serve as a way to 
mitigate the agency problem which could also lower the cost of debt (Chami and Fullenkamp, 
2002; Dudley and Zhang, 2016).  
 
We look at the issuance yield of Yankee Bonds as our proxy for debt financing cost. 
Following earlier studies (Dudley and Zhang, 2016; Guiso et al., 2008a, 2008b, etc.), we 
measure trust at a country level based on the citizens’ average response to the question in the 
World Values Survey (WVS) and the European Value Survey (EVS): “Generally speaking, 
would you say that most people can be trusted or you need to be very careful in dealing with 
people?”1 By examining 6,098 issues from 24 countries from 1996 to 2015, we find firms 
with a higher level of societal trust have a lower cost for borrowing debt. One standard 
                                               
1  The data of the World Value Survey (WVS) is from the official WVS website: 
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp; and the data from the European Value Survey (EVS) is from 
http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu/.  
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deviation increase in trust would lead to a 0.77% lower yield when firms are issuing bonds. 
This number is both statistically and economically significant, and confirms our hypothesis 
that the level of societal trust among people has a real impact on firms’ financing cost. 
 
The second question to be answered is: how does trust interact with other country governance 
mechanisms in reducing agency cost? Both formal and informal institutions play important 
roles in economic growth. However, the relative importance and interaction of both 
mechanisms in determining financing cost is unknown. On the one hand, formal institution 
could provide a channel for trust to be maintained and distrust to be punished. As a result, 
when formal institution is stronger, the effect of trust on cost of debt could be more salient. 
On the other hand, if trust as an informal institutional has independent value and could 
manifest itself through other channels, it could be a substitute to the formal institution. As a 
result, we could observe weaker effect of trust on cost of debt when the formal institution is 
stronger. Our analysis confirms the second argument. Moreover, we find that among six 
dimensions of country governance, the effect of trust in reducing the cost of debt is related to 
government effectiveness, control of corruption, political stability, and voice and 
accountability, but less correlated with regulatory quality and the rule of law index.  
 
The last question to be looked at concerns the effect of trust on financing cost during the 
financial crisis. At a time when credit becomes scarce, and resources and collateral become 
increasingly important in obtaining funding, will trust between people be helpful in 
alleviating panic, smooth credit transactions and therefore have an impact on the real 
economy? We find that a higher level of trust among people could significantly lower the 
impact of a financial crisis in increasing financing cost. These findings provide additional 
evidence on the effect of trust on the real economy.  
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We conduct a battery of methodologies to examine above questions, including ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression, Tobit regression, and higher order fixed effects. Additionally, we 
also employ different methods to rule out the possibilities of reverse causality, 
multicollinearity issues, and so on, by performing a variety of robustness checks. Our results 
are robust and valid after conducting these robustness checks. 
 
Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, by investigating the relationship 
between trust and the cost of debt, we can quantify the valuation of market participants on 
social capital and show that social capital will be an important resource of the firm, as is not 
only being acknowledged by academics, but also by market participants. Second, we 
contribute to the governance literature by providing evidence that trust can serve as a 
supplement to the traditional channel of corporate monitoring. We also contribute to the 
literature investigating the financing of the firm during a financial crisis by providing the 
evidence that social capital in stabilizing the shock created by the crisis.  
  
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces background and formulates 
hypotheses. Section 3 introduces the sample construction, describes the variables, exhibits the 
model specification, and presents summary statistics. Section 4 reports the regression results. 
Section 5 presents a variety of robustness checks. Section 6 provides further discussions. 
Section 7 offers some concluding remarks.  
 
2. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses Design  
 
 
Governance institutions can be divided into formal and informal ones, depending on their 
nature and enforcement. Helmke and Levitsky (2004) define informal institution as “socially 
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shared rules, usually unwritten that are created, communicated and enforced outside of 
officially sanctioned channels”. Informal institutions can shape the way that people look at 
the world (Chui et al., 2002), determine the reaction of people to the events occurring in the 
world (Witt and Redding, 2009), and influence the way people interact with each other 
(Zilber, 2006). They are also the underlying base that the formal institutions of a society are  
based on (Holmes et al., 2011). There is a large strand of literature confirming the crucial role 
of informal institutions in the economy.2 
 
As a crucial type of social capital, societal trust is an informal institution in a country. The 
level of trust could be an important factor that influences the financing cost of firms. There 
are two types of trust in the discussion of the cost of capital. The first one is personal trust, 
which is the set of beliefs of a certain firm or individual. The second notion is societal trust, 
which could be viewed as a set of beliefs of a group of firms or individuals (Dudley and 
Zhang, 2016). While both types of trust are important in the financial market, this paper 
mainly focuses on societal trust. The main reason for this choice is that personal trust can 
only be established after repeated interaction. It relies on the long-term relationship between 
two parties. When a firm is seeking international debt financing, the investors and firms are 
likely to be separated both geographically and culturally, therefore their beliefs about each 
other would be more likely to be based on societal instead of personal trust. Therefore, 
compared to personal trust, societal trust is more relevant in our study. 
                                               
2 For example: Fukuyama, (1995), Guiso et al. (2009), Guiso et al., (2004), Duarte et al. (2012) Bottazzi et al. 
(2016b), Ahern et al. (2015). 
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The asymmetry of information (Myers and Majluf, 1984) makes debt holders concerned 
about managers’ expropriation. Specifically, responding to managers’ opportunistic behavior 
and potential wealth expropriation, debt holders will require a higher payback of debt from 
firms if they anticipate that managers are less trustworthy. On the contrary, in a more 
trustworthy society, debt holders face lower market uncertainty and require a lower price for 
their debt investment in the firm. In addition, trust changes the level of risk aversion. For 
instance, in a more trustworthy country, investors are willing to bear higher risk and demand 
lower premiums. Trust also changes transaction and monitoring costs. With a higher level of 
trust, investors may not need to spend a significant amount of resources to investigate the 
firm before debt issuance and/or monitor the firm’s daily operations after investment, which 
could lead to a lower cost of debt. Finally, trust reduces business cost and increases 
operational efficiency. Overall, trust in a society may lead to a reduction of business cost. For 
example, in a highly mutual-trust country, supermarkets may not need to use many anti-theft 
devices, which could reduce their operational cost and lead to lower financing cost. These 
agreements imply that trust should have a negative direct effect on the cost of debt. On this 
basis, we develop the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: Firms in a more trustworthy society have a lower cost of debt financing: bond spreads.  
 
 
The informal institution is important to a country. However, the effect of it on the society is 
neither independent nor static. To get a comprehensive understanding on how trust could 
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influence financing cost, we have to fit our discussion to the general background of a 
country’s governance and link it to the economic condition. For this purpose, this paper also 
looks at how trust interacts with the formal institution to determine the cost of debt and how 
this effect varies with the condition of the financial market.  
 
Existing studies find interactions between formal and informal institution in determining the 
economic outcome ( Holmes et al., 2011; Pevzner et al., 2015). However, the interaction of 
trust and formal institutions in influencing the cost of debt is still unknown. Previous studies 
find that formal institutions in a country are ultimately the outcome of informal institutions 
(Reed, 1996; Redding, 2005; Jackson and Deeg, 2008). If the level of societal trust has been 
incorporated into the design and enforcement of formal institutions, such institutions would 
be the main channel through which trust could effectively influence the cost of debt. This 
argument implies a complementary relation between trust and formal institutions. In other 
words, when the formal institution is more effective, the impact of trust on the cost of debt is 
more prominent. On the other hand, formal and informal institutions have different values, as 
formal institutions are not perfect (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004). If the effect of trust on debt 
financing cost could manifest itself through different channels, informal institutions could be 
more important in business activity when the formal institution was weak. If so, we could 
therefore observe a substitution effect of trust on the cost of debt (Guiso et al., 2004). These 
opposing arguments imply that the contingent effect of trust on the cost of debt is unknown; 
therefore, we propose the following hypotheses: 
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H2a: The effect of trust on the cost of debt is more pronounced in countries with weaker 
governance quality.  
H2b: The effect of trust on the cost of debt is more pronounced in countries with stronger 
governance quality.  
 
Institutively, the financial crisis brings instability to current financial developments. Stiglitz 
(2008) argues that “The present financial crisis springs from a catastrophic collapse in 
confidence. Financial markets hinge on trust, and that trust has eroded.”3 Lins et al. (2017) 
also argue that trust is an important “asset” of a society, and investment on it would pay off 
when trustworthiness is more valuable, such as in a period of financial crisis. These studies 
stress the important role of trust during financial instability. During a financial crisis, 
investors demand higher risk premiums on debt to provide financing. In this case, a higher 
level of trust in a society could perform a more important role in reducing financing cost. 
Hence, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H3: The effect of trust on the cost of debt is more pronounced during a financial crisis.  
 
3. Methodology and Descriptive Statistics  
 
 
                                               
3 We don’t think that this statement implies that a financial crisis would weaken the trust at a societal level. 
First of all, our data did not support this argument as we do not find a significant change in the level of trust 
after the financial crisis. Second, trust is widely connected to the culture, history, and formal institutions of a 
society. Compared to the broad context in which the trust is embedded, financial markets play only a very small 
part in the determinants and are unlikely to play major role in the variation of societal trust. 
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3.1. Construction of the Sample  
 
Following Boubakri and Ghouma (2010) and Qi et al. (2011), we start our sample with all 
bonds issued in the US market by foreign investors (Yankee Bonds) in the DataStream 
database from 1996 to 2015. We concentrate our analysis on the Yankee market to make sure 
that the variations in the financing cost of the firm originates from differences in the firms 
instead of differences in the investors.4  
  
We then merge our sample with Compustat database to obtain the firm-level accounting 
variables. We consider all firms that have complete information on both bond- and firm-level 
information. Finally, we merge the data with country-level variables such as trust, 
governance environment, and country-level controls, which are GDP growth, inflation rate, 
and domestic bond market size. We obtain a final sample with 6,098 bond issues. Table 1 
reports the distribution and the description of our sample. Most bonds were issued after 2006, 
especially during 2008–2012, weighting about 67% of total issues. Table 1 also shows that 
most issues of Yankee Bonds come from the UK, and then Germany.  
 
3.2. Variables and Data Source  
 
Cost of Debt Measures  
 
                                               
4 A detailed discussion on the Yankee market can be found in Miller and Puthenpurackal (2002). 
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Following the literature, we use the bond issuance yield as our proxy for the cost of debt 
financing (Boubakri and Ghouma, 2010; Oikonomou et al., 2014). We define the bond spread 
(Spread) as the yield to maturity of a bond at issuance minus the yield to maturity of a US 
Treasury Bond of a similar maturity. We obtain the yield to maturity data from the Thomson 
Reuters DataStream.  
 
Trust Measure 
 
Our measure of societal trust comes from the official websites of WVS and EVS. These two 
surveys, which began in 1981 and are updated every 4–5 years, provide rigorous and 
high-quality research designs to global networks of social scientists studying changing values 
and their impact on social and political life. The WVS consists of nationally representative 
surveys conducted in almost 100 countries which contain almost 90% of the world’s 
population, and the EVS covers 47 European countries. Moreover the WVS and EVS are the 
major academic studies covering the full range of global variation, from poor to rich 
countries, in all of the world’s major cultural zones, and hence are appropriate and reliable 
sources to quantify societal trust. The key variable Trust is measured as the standardized 
score capturing the level of societal trust following the survey question from WVS and EVS:  
 
“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or you need to be very 
carefully in dealing with people?” 
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The value of Trust is defined as the ratio of people who responded to the survey with the 
answer “most people can be trusted” over the total people who carried out the survey. We fill 
the missing values following the most recent surveys for years between two adjacent surveys.  
 
Country Governance Indicator  
 
Following Kaufmann et al. (2009), our Country governance indicator is taken from the 
Worldwide Governance Indicator available from the World Bank, that captures the level of 
investor protection. It consists of six components: government effectiveness (GE), regulatory 
quality (RQ), control of corruption (CC), political stability (PS), rule of law (RL), and voice 
and accountability (VA). More details of these six dimensions are presented in Appendix A. 
We calculate the aggregate value of these six dimensions as our Country governance 
indicator (CGIndicator).  
 
Control Variables 
 
For control variables, following earlier studies such as Boubakri and Ghoum (2010) and 
Oikonomou et al. (2014), we include country-, firm-, and bond-level characteristics. For 
country-level controls, we include GDP growth (GDPgrowth), Inflation rate to reflect the 
country’s macroeconomic conditions, and the ratio of total debt issued over GDP (DebtMkt) 
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to reflect each country’s debt market size. The country-level variables can be found in World 
Bank public data. For firm-level controls, we have firm size Asset (the natural logarithm of 
the firm’s total assets), return on investments (ROI) that indicates firm performance, 
Leverage that captures the ratio of total debt to total assets, and firms’ operational risk that is 
measured as the standard deviation of return on assets (ROA) for year-4 to year; more 
information will be provided in Appendix A. The firm-level variables are from Compustat. 
For bond-level controls, we employ the natural logarithm of years to maturity (Maturity), the 
natural logarithm of the total amount of bond issue as bond issue size (Lisize). The bond-level 
controls are available from DataStream.  
 
3.3. Model Specification  
 
As discussed in detail in Section 3.1, the whole sample covers 1996–2015, which collects 
6,098 different Yankee Bond issuances issued by different firms during this period. Hence, 
we will recognize each issuance as an observation to obtain a cross-sectional dataset and 
conduct the OLS regression. In order to control for any endogeneity issues arising from the 
omitted variables that are correlated with the included variables, fixed effects will be used. 
The fixed effects formulation implies that differences across groups can be captured in 
differences in the constant term. In sample period, some firms may only issue bonds once, 
industry fixed effects rather firm fixed effects may therefore be more appropriate in baseline 
models as the bond spread and firm fixed effect will be perfectly correlated for these firms. 
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However, we will also present a firm fixed effects model and higher order fixed effects as 
robustness checks. In short, we will estimate the following models: 
 
                                                                                
                                          (1) 
 
        
                                                                        
                                                                              
                                        (2) 
                                                                  
                                                                                                  
                                       (3) 
 
where i indexes a firm, j indexes a country, and t indexes a year; Cost of Debt denotes bond 
spread;         is the response to WVS for country j in year t; and               is the 
aggregate World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicator. Financial Crisis is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the world has suffered a financial crisis (2007–2009), and zero 
otherwise. Each of these three models tests hypotheses H1–H3, respectively.  
 
3.4. Descriptive Statistics 
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Panel A of Table 2 reports the average value of trust and the six dimensions of country 
governance by each country from 1996 to 2015. Panel B shows the average of other 
country-level variables, including the aggregate level of CGindicator, the mean value of 
country-level controls in the same period. We also report both mean and median bond spread 
for 6,098 bond issues across different countries in Panel B.  
 
As shown in Panel A, the trust level varies across different countries. Brazil (0.07) and 
Malaysia (0.09) are among the countries with the lowest trust level, while the Scandinavian 
countries, such as Demark, Norway, and Sweden have the highest level of trust, 
approximately 0.7. There is also a variation in the level of country governance environment. 
Argentina, Brazil, India, Malaysia, and Mexico show one or more negative values of the 
country governance sub-components, and the Scandinavian countries still exhibit the highest 
score of governance indicator.  
 
Looking at Panel B, the first column is the sum of the six governance dimensions reported in 
Panel A. We can find on average that the less developed countries have a weaker governance 
environment compared to the more developed countries. For instance, India has the lowest 
governance score (–1.51) and Finland has the highest (11.24).  
 
For the country-level controls, India has the highest ratio (6.89%) of GDP growth on average; 
Japan and Singapore have quite high levels of inflation, reaching 2.68% and 4.37%, 
respectively. Belgium, Japan, and Greece are highly leveraged countries, with a ratio of total 
debt to GDP higher than 100%. 
 
Turning to the bond spread, we find that the variation of spread also exists in different 
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countries. Canada, the UK, Norway, and Switzerland have the highest bond yields, with the 
spread around 10%, while the countries with the lowest spread, such as India and Singapore, 
only issue bonds at a yield of 1% higher than the benchmark Treasury Bill.  
 
Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics of each variable (Panel A) and Pearson Correlat ion 
(Panel B). To mitigate the extreme outliers, we winsorize firm- and bond-level variables 
(including the bond spread) by 1% level at both tails. Panel A shows that the mean value of 
Spread is 9.08%, with the standard deviation as 5.1%, and it varies from 0 to 19.83%. Panel 
B reveals an important finding, that trust is negatively (–0.079) and significantly (at the 1% 
significance level) correlated to bond spread, which is consistent with H1. The correlations 
between trust and country governance indicators as well as GDP growth are significantly 
positive, and those correlations with the inflation rate and domestic debt market size are 
significantly negative. Panel B also reports that the correlation between Trust and 
CGindicator is just around 0.5, more accurately 0.544, and this figure reduces our concerns 
about multicollinearity between these two variables.  
 
4. Econometric Estimation 
 
4.1. Trust and the Cost of Debt 
 
This section investigates the relation between trust and the cost of debt financing by using 
panel regressions that control for a variety of fixed effects. One possible concern is that trust 
may be highly correlated to the country governance indicators, though as reported in Panel B 
of Table 3 this is not a major concern. In order to largely free us from this issue, we conduct a 
multivariate regression clustered at a firm level and include the above variables as controls in 
addition to the primary measure of trust. We also control for unobserved industry variations 
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by adding industry fixed effects at the 2 digit SIC level and control for unobserved 
time-invariant effects by employing year fixed effects. Table 4 reports our baseline results, 
with the odd columns controlling for the country fixed effects and Columns the even columns 
without country effects.  
 
Columns (1) and (2) examine the full sample. Looking at Column (1), that controls for 
country effects, trust is significantly and negatively related to bond spread, which confirms 
H1. With a one standard deviation increase in trust, the firm could issue debt at a 0.77% low 
yield (–9.835 0.078). This effect is both statistically and economically significant. Column 
(2) reports a similar finding in a regression without country effects.  
 
To avoid the concern that our result is mainly driven by certain issuers which dominate 
Yankee Bond issuance, we exclude bond issuance by the most frequent issuers as a 
robustness check and only include firms with fewer than 50 (Columns (3)–(4)) and fewer 
than 20 (Columns (5)–(6)) issues per year in the analysis. Both sub-samples are also 
examined with and without country fixed effects, and all of them report similar results to 
those reported in Columns (1) and (2), implying that the findings obtained by the baseline 
model are robust and solid.  
 
The results reported in Table 4 confirm our first hypothesis that, as representing social capital, 
a country’s societal trust does lower firms’ cost to borrow debt, and that this impact is both 
statistically and economically significant.  
 
4.2. Country Governance, Trust, and the Cost of Debt 
 
In this section, we test H2 and explore how the effect of trust varies between firms with 
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different country governance environments by interacting the country governance indicator 
(CGindicator) with Trust, and including both CGindicator and the interaction term of 
Trust*CGindicator into the model. As shown in Column (1) of Table 5, the effect of trust is 
significantly different in countries with a better and a poor governance environment. The 
interaction term is positive and significant at the 1% level, which implies that trust has a more 
pronounced effect on the cost of debt in poor governance countries, and hence the results 
confirm H2a that the effect of trust on the cost of debt is more pronounced in countries with 
weak governance quality. 
 
We next explore if the country governance indicator is driven by one particular dimension of 
governance indicator by adding each sub-component in the model, and report the results in 
Columns (2)–(7) of Table 5. To avoid any multicollinearity issue, we exclude the variable 
CGIndicator and only include each of six dimensions along with its interaction with trust in 
each regression. As shown in Columns (2)–(7), Trust still stays significantly negative (5% 
significance level and higher) for four dimensions except for Regulatory Quality and Rule of 
Law. In addition, the interaction effect seems not to be driven by an individual effect of a 
sub-component of governance indicators. In sum, these findings confirm H2 that the country 
governance environment moderates trust’s impact on corporate debt financing – that is, the 
negative effect of trust on bond spread is stronger in weak governance countries. These 
results imply that as a core notion of informal institution, trust has a substitution effect with 
country governance environment, which is generally known as the formal institution. When 
the formation institutions are weak, the informal institutions could be more important in 
influencing business activities. 
 
4.3. The Cost of Debt during a Financial Crisis 
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In this section, we test H3 and investigate whether trust will influence corporate financing 
cost during a financial crisis. Intuitively, firms have to offer higher yields to attract investors 
during a financial crisis, and the firms located in low-trust countries may have to provide 
more returns to debt holders. Based on this basis, we create a dummy variable FCrisis that is 
equal to one if firms were suffering the most recent financial crisis. Specifically, FCrisis is 
defined as one if the year is between 2007 and 2009, and zero otherwise. We interact it with 
Trust and add FCrisis and the interaction term into the model. Table 6 presents the results 
with and without country effects in Columns (1) and (2), respectively, and they show similar 
findings except that the interaction term in Column (2) loses significance. The only difference 
between two columns is whether the regression model adds country fixed effects; as this is a 
cross-country study, estimating results with country effects reported in Column (1) might be 
more meaningful. From Table 6, we can find that the coefficient of FCrisis is statistically 
significant and positive, suggesting that firms have to pay higher returns on debt borrowing 
during a financial crisis. The negative correlation of the interaction term implies that trust 
plays a more pivotal role during a financial crisis. All in all, these results confirm H3 that 
during a financial crisis, the effect of trust on debt cost is more pronounced, whereas trust 
plays a role to alleviate panics arising from financial distress among investors. 
 
5. Robustness Checks 
 
In this section, we conduct several robustness checks to see if the results obtained above still 
hold, and present the results in Table 7. To conserve space, we do not report control variables 
in Table 7 though we have included all controls when running regressions.  
 
5.1 Tobit Model  
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First, as all the values of corporate bond spread are larger than zero, we adopt the Tobit 
regression which was proposed by James Tobin (Tobin, 1958). Unlike OLS, the Tobit 
regression describes the relationship between independent variables and a non-negative 
dependent variable, and hence may provide more robust and solid results compared to OLS in 
this study. Panel A of Table 7 reports the results by re-estimating H1–H3, for all three 
regressions; we control for year, industry, and country fixed effects and cluster the standard 
deviation at the firm level. Column (1) re-examines H1, and reports that with a one unit 
increase in trust, the bond spread yield can be lowered by 10.417%, and this finding is 
significant at the 5% level. Column (2) re-examines H2, which confirms that trust’s impact 
on a lower bond spread is more pronounced in countries with a weak governance 
environment, and all coefficients are significant at the 5% level and higher. Column (3) 
re-examines H3; though the direct impact of trust on bond spread loses significance here, the 
interaction term of trust and financial crisis is still significant, suggesting that during a 
financial crisis, trust could alleviate investors’ panic and smooth the financial market.  
 
5.2 Reverse Causality 
 
Second, one common endogeneity concern arising is reverse causality – that the independent 
variable is actually the cause of change in the dependent variable. Though we believe that this 
concern does not apply to our study, more specifically, as it is highly unlikely the trust 
between people in a country is the result of financing cost, we will still re-examine H1–H3 by 
employing the lagged value of trust and country governance indicator in order to rule out the 
possibility of reverse causality.  
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Panel B of Table 7 reports the regression results estimated from H1–H3, respectively. As 
shown, we find that the results are consistent with those reported in Tables 4–6, that the 
lagged value of trust has a significantly negative impact on the cost of debt financing, and 
that this impact is more pronounced in countries with weak governance quality and during a 
financial crisis. 
 
5.3 A Variety of Fixed Effects 
 
Panel C of Table 7 reports the estimations of another four robustness checks. Another 
potential endogeneity, which could raise concerns about our argument, is omitted variable 
bias. The bond spread depends on various factors so that it is practically impossible to fully 
control for all of them in an empirical study. Our main analysis already includes the year, 
country, and industry fixed effects; therefore, time-invariant and cross-sectional-invariant 
factors are less likely to cause a problem. To further alleviate such concern, we employ firm 
fixed effects to remove firm specific characteristics. To conserve space, we only report the 
results by re-estimating H1, which are presented in Column (1) of Panel C. We find that both 
the signs and significance of coefficients are consistent with those reported in Table 4.  
 
Additionally, we also adopt the identification from Gormley and Matsa (2014) by employing 
a high order fixed effects’ specification in our tests. The results of re-estimating H1 are 
reported in Column (2) of Table Panel C, which includes country-level fixed effects and the 
double fixed effects of Year  SIC Industry Code. Industry is a time-invariant effect, so when 
we multiply it with Year then the interaction term varies with time and could eliminate 
unobserved firm and industry-specific characteristics which vary across time. The results are 
also consistent with those reported in Table 4. 
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5.4 Multicollinearity Issue 
 
As reported in Table 3, the correlation between Trust and CGindicator is 0.544, which it may 
not exist multicollineariy problem between these two variables. Additionally, we also 
separate all 6,098 observations into four groups and comparing the value of CGindicator and 
Trust to the sample median. We find that there are 3,541 observations in group of high trust 
weak formal institution (58% of all observations) and 1,300 observations in group of low 
trust and strong institution (21% of all observations). As there are enough observations in 
these two groups, multicollinearity problem is not a significant issue.5 However, to further 
rule out this possibility, we re-run H1 by only including the variable Trust and find that the 
results reported in Column (3) of Table Panel C are similar to those obtained by having both 
Trust and CGindicator, which implies that multicollinearity seems not to be a significant 
issue.  
 
5.5 More Control Variables 
 
For the bond-level control variables, we have included the bond issue size and maturity 
followed earlier studies (Boubakri and Ghouma, 2010; Oikonomou et al., 2014). Bond credit 
rating and covenants are associated with bond risks, investor confidence, etc., and hence may 
be correlated to the cost of debt. Due to data limitation, only debt ratings can be examined. 
Following Boubakri and Ghouma (2010), we convert Standard & Poor’s bond ratings to a 
seven-grade rating scale, with a higher figure reflecting a higher rating of corporate bond. We 
present the credit rating transformations in Appendix B. Column (4) of Panel C reports the 
results by adding credit ratings as a control variable to re-examine H1. As shown, credit 
                                               
5 We thank an anonymous referee to suggest us to do this test to mitigate the multicollinearity issue.  
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ratings have a significantly negative impact on the cost of debt, more specifically; a higher 
rating of bond rating may improve investors’ confidence and hence reduce the cost of debt 
issuance. Moreover, the coefficient of Trust is in line with that without credit ratings.  
 
In short, this section conducts a variety of robustness checks and confirms that our results 
obtained from baseline models are solid and robust. 
 
6. Further discussions 
 
6.1. Why specific country governance dimensions are useful 
In Table 5, we report the results by estimating six country governance indexes, and find that 
the effect of trust in reducing the cost of debt is related to government effectiveness, control 
of corruption, political stability, and voice and accountability, but less correlated with 
regulatory quality and the rule of law.  
 
Bris and Cabolis (2008), Dudley and Zhang (2016) and Martynova and Renneboog (2008) 
propose that formal institution can lower transaction costs, and hence in our study four 
dimensions of country governance quality are observed to lower the cost of debt. However, 
Gilardi (2010) points out it has proven very difficult to differentiate between possible causal 
mechanisms given the existing state of theory and available econometric techniques in 
practice.  
 
According to Kaufmann et al. (2009), regulatory quality captures the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and 
promote private sector development. However, Kaufmann and Kraay (2008) and Kaufmann 
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et al. (2009) also point out there are often gaps between de jure rules and their de facto 
implementation in the real world, and the correlation between the two is weak in some 
countries. A higher index of regulatory quality may imply both high levels of rule formulation 
and implementation, but it also can be a combination of a high level of rule formulation but a 
low level of rule implementation, which are difficult to differentiate. Therefore, this index 
may not have a significant impact on reducing cost of debt. Another index rule of law 
captures perceptions of the extent to which individuals and agents have confidence in and 
abide by the society. A higher index is expected to lower the cost of debt; however, we do not 
observe significant findings. Kaufmann and Kraay (2008) do admit that governance 
indicators may also contain unobserved broad dimensions of governance, and hence it is 
possible that some unobserved factors may explain the insignificant findings, which can be 
explored in future. Empirically, Dudley and Zhang (2016) also find that higher levels of 
government effectiveness, as well as voice and accountability, will lower agency problems 
and reduce the corporate cost to capital markets, though they also find that regulatory quality 
matters in their study. These questions also can be explored further in future studies.  
 
6.2. Limitation of the study and suggestions for future research 
 
This paper is by no means perfect. We admit that some limitations in this study and there are 
still some related questions left unanswered. First, this paper only considers debt as a 
financing tool, while the cost of equity and associated overall cost of capital are not 
investigated. A related question is that the change of debt financing cost could lead to a 
change in the capital structure of the firm. How does trust influence this process? Second, for 
consistency and comparison purpose, we only look at the Yankee Bond market in this study. 
Although the Yankee Bond market is a large and liquid bond issuance market, it is not the 
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only market for firms seeking international financing. In addition, a considerable amount of 
debt financing is conducted in the domestic market. These questions as to how the cost of 
debt and firm decisions are influenced by trust in such markets remain unexplored. 
 
7. Conclusion  
 
This paper examines the role of societal trust in affecting corporate debt financing. We 
document three important findings. First, firms in the country with higher level of societal 
trust are facing lower cost of debt. Higher trust could mitigate agency cost, lower monitoring 
and transaction cost. Therefore, investors are more willing to provide capital to the firm. 
Second, we find that trust and the associated informal governance institutions could largely 
substitute the effect of formal institutions in the process of debt financing. As a result, trust is 
more valuable for the country with weaker formal institutions. Lastly, we find that the 
financing cost of firms in a high trust country would experience a lower increase in the 
financial crisis compared to their peers in a low trust country, showing that societal trust is an 
important buffer for the firm when facing financial instability.  
 
This paper reveals the unique value of trust to a firm. Default or distrust behavior may look 
profitable for some firms or even countries at a first glance. However, the breach of trust 
would lead to increased financing cost in the debt market. On the other hand, keeping the 
promise may be costly in the short run, but the associated lower financing cost would 
mitigate the loss in the long run. Our research also stresses the unique value of informal 
institutions in business activity. In a society where individuals are expected to fulfill their 
promises, strict regulation may not be needed and policy makers can utilize the flexibility of 
informal institutions to encourage economic growth. 
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Overall, to our best knowledge, our paper is the first piece of research that links trust to 
corporate debt cost, which extends earlier studies examining the association between trust 
and other economic and financial activities and contributes to the finance literature by 
showing that trust may be economically and significantly related to corporate debt policy.  
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Appendix A: Variables Description and Data Source  
Variable  Description  Data Source  
Country-Level Variables： 
Trust  This captures trust level, calculated based on 
responses to the WVS and EVS question: 
“Generally speaking, would you say that most 
people can be trusted or that you need to be 
very careful in dealing with people?” The 
value of trust is defined as the ratio of people 
who responded that most people can be 
trusted. We fill in the missing values following 
the most recent surveys for the years between 
the two adjacent surveys. 
World Value 
Survey and 
European 
Value Survey 
Country 
Governance 
Indicator 
(CGIndicator)  
This captures country specific level of investor 
protection. It is the sum of government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, control of 
corruption, political stability, rule of law, and 
voice and accountability as described in 
Kaufmann et al. (2009) at 
http://data.worldbank.org/ 
data-catalog/worldwide-governance-indicators. 
World Bank 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicator 
Government 
Effectiveness (GE) 
This captures perceptions of the quality of 
public services, the quality of the civil service 
and the degree of its dependence from political 
pressures, the quality of policy formulation 
and implementation, and the credibility of the 
government’s commitment to such policies.  
World Bank 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicator 
Regulatory Quality 
(RE) 
This captures perceptions of the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound 
policies and regulation that permit and 
promote private sector development.  
World Bank 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicator 
Control of 
Corruption (CC) 
This captures perceptions of the extent to 
which public power is exercised for private 
gain.  
World Bank 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicator 
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Political Stability 
(PS)  
This captures the level of political stability 
and absence of violence or terrorism.  
World Bank 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicator 
Rule of Law (RL) This captures perceptions of the extent to 
which individuals and agents have 
confidence in and abide by the society, and 
in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement.  
World Bank 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicator 
Voice and 
Accountability (VA) 
This captures perceptions of the extent to 
which a country’s citizens are able to voice 
their opinions and participate in selecting 
their government.  
World Bank 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicator 
GDP Growth 
(GDPgrowth) 
Average annual growth of GDP.  World Bank 
Inflation  Annual percentage changes of each 
country’s Consumer Price Index (CPI).  
World Bank 
Debt Market Size 
(DebtMkt) 
The ratio of total debts per year over this 
country’s GDP.  
World Bank 
Bond-Level Variables:  
Spread The difference between the yield to maturity 
on the bond issue and the yield to maturity 
on a US Treasury Bond of similar maturity. 
DataStream  
Issue Size (Lisize) The natural logarithm of the size (offering 
amount) of the issue in million US $.  
DataStream 
Maturity  The natural logarithm of the years to 
maturity.  
DataStream 
Firm-Level Variables:  
Firm Size (Asset) The natural logarithm of the annual total 
assets of the firm in million US $. 
Compustat 
Performance (ROI)  The return on investment of each firm.  Compustat 
Leverage  The ratio of total debts to total assets of each 
firm.  
Compustat 
Risk The firm’s operational risk measured by the 
standard deviation of return on assets (ROA) 
for the year-4 to year, more specifically, 
Risk is the standard deviation of ROA for 
year-4, year-3, year-2, year-1 and year.  
Compustat 
FCrisis  A dummy variable indicating the recent 
financial crisis. FCrisis is equal to one if the 
year is between 2007 and 2009, and zero 
otherwise.  
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Appendix B: S&P Credit Ratings Transformations 
S&P initial ratings Transformation  
AAA  7 
AA+, AA, AA– 6 
A+, A, A– 5 
BBB+, BBB, BBB– 4 
BB+, BB, BB– 3 
B+, B, B– 2 
CCC+, CCC, CCC–, CC, C, D 1 
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Table 1 
Data Distribution 
This table provides a description of the distribution of bond issues by year (reported in Panel A) and by 
country (reported in Panel B). 
Panel A: Issues by Year 
Year Number Ratio % Cumulative % 
1996 7 0.11  0.11  
1997 5 0.08  0.20  
1998 3 0.05  0.25  
1999 14 0.23  0.48  
2000 18 0.30  0.77  
2001 7 0.11  0.89  
2002 13 0.21  1.10  
2003 18 0.30  1.39  
2004 14 0.23  1.62  
2005 30 0.49  2.12  
2006 98 1.61  3.72  
2007 102 1.67  5.40  
2008 1,049 17.20  22.60  
2009 981 16.09  38.68  
2010 1,740 28.53  67.22  
2011 764 12.53  79.75  
2012 605 9.92  89.67  
2013 308 5.05  94.72  
2014 186 3.05  97.77  
2015 136 2.23  100.00  
Total 6,098   
Panel B: Issues by Country 
Country Number Ratio % Cumulative % 
Argentina 5 0.08  0.08  
Australia 84 1.38  1.46  
Belgium 2 0.03  1.49  
Brazil 2 0.03  1.53  
Canada 20 0.33  1.85  
Denmark 3 0.05  1.90  
Finland 3 0.05  1.95  
France 13 0.21  2.16  
Germany 358 5.87  8.04  
UK 4,975 81.58  89.62  
Greece 4 0.07  89.69  
India 1 0.02  89.70  
Ireland 10 0.16  89.87  
Japan 13 0.21  90.08  
Luxembourg 18 0.30  90.37  
Malaysia 1 0.02  90.39  
Mexico 28 0.46  90.85  
Netherlands 137 2.25  93.10  
Norway 124 2.03  95.13  
Singapore 4 0.07  95.20  
Sweden 39 0.64  95.83  
Switzerland 254 4.17  100.00  
Total 6,098   
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Table 2 
Summary Statistics 
This table reports the summary statistics of trust, country governance indicators, country-level controls, 
and bond spreads from 1996 to 2015.  
Panel A: Trust and Country Governance Level 
This panel reports the average level of trust and six dimensions of the country-level governance 
indicator across the world.  
Country Trust  Government 
Effectiveness  
Regulatory 
Quality 
Control of 
Corruption 
Political 
Stability 
Rule of 
Law 
Voice and 
Accountability 
Argentina 0.18 -0.02 -0.38 -0.39 -0.11 -0.51 0.28 
Australia 0.46 1.72 1.62 1.94 1.02 1.75 1.45 
Belgium 0.32 1.72 1.24 1.41 0.90 1.32 1.39 
Brazil 0.07 -0.07 0.19 -0.05 -0.12 -0.27 0.35 
Canada 0.41 1.87 1.60 2.05 1.02 1.73 1.51 
Denmark 0.69 2.09 1.80 2.43 1.16 1.90 1.61 
Finland 0.57 2.11 1.75 2.38 1.46 1.95 1.58 
France 0.23 1.55 1.09 1.37 0.57 1.41 1.24 
Germany 0.36 1.68 1.49 1.87 0.97 1.65 1.37 
UK 0.32 1.73 1.80 1.91 0.55 1.68 1.33 
Greece 0.20 0.64 0.74 0.31 0.33 0.72 0.92 
India 0.32 -0.08 -0.35 -0.42 -1.14 0.10 0.38 
Ireland 0.38 1.59 1.69 1.59 1.20 1.63 1.39 
Japan 0.38 1.33 0.96 1.28 1.02 1.31 1.00 
Luxembourg 0.27 1.83 1.73 2.00 1.40 1.79 1.53 
Malaysia 0.09 1.02 0.56 0.31 0.18 0.49 -0.35 
Mexico 0.18 0.21 0.36 -0.34 -0.57 -0.54 0.11 
Netherlands 0.57 1.91 1.81 2.16 1.17 1.76 1.59 
Norway 0.70 1.92 1.41 2.16 1.30 1.92 1.61 
Singapore 0.21 2.15 1.98 2.23 1.11 1.56 -0.03 
Sweden 0.63 1.97 1.57 2.27 1.25 1.87 1.60 
Switzerland 0.44 1.98 1.66 2.14 1.32 1.87 1.54 
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Panel B: CGindicator, Country-Level Controls, and Bond Spread 
This panel reports the average level of the CGindicator (the aggregate of the six governance dimensions 
in Panel A), country-level controls, both mean and median values of bond spread across the world.  
Country CGindicator GDPgrowth 
 
Inflation DebtMkt  Mean Bond 
Spread  
Median Bond 
Spread  
Argentina -1.13 2.91 -1.39 58.57 5.45  5.16  
Australia 9.51 3.30 0.23 19.70 0.93  0.94  
Belgium 7.99 1.80 -2.18 103.7 2.10  2.10  
Brazil 0.02 2.99 -0.01 64.26 5.35  5.35  
Canada 9.79 2.55 0.29 81.28 9.61  9.71  
Denmark 10.98 1.28 0.02 45.58 1.67  1.81  
Finland 11.24 2.25 1.04 45.11 1.41  1.24  
France 7.23 1.59 0.89 70.33 2.18  1.45  
Germany 9.02 1.33 0.19 66.49 7.82  8.46  
UK 9.00 2.10 0.02 52.79 9.41  9.78  
Greece 3.66 0.91 -0.01 121.30 4.58  4.53  
India -1.51 6.89 0.03 73.49 1.31  1.31  
Ireland 9.09 4.62 -0.32 59.43 3.57  2.81  
Japan 6.90 0.84 2.68 179.8 0.94  0.64  
Luxembourg 10.27 3.77 0.28 12.03 3.93  3.85  
Malaysia 2.22 4.90 0.25 42.71 2.31  2.31  
Mexico -0.77 2.92 -0.09 43.01 4.26  4.00  
Netherlands 10.40 1.94 0.04 57.29 5.82  5.50  
Norway 10.33 2.13 0.39 36.00 12.66  12.53  
Singapore 8.99 5.55 4.37 92.11 1.66  1.85  
Sweden 10.52 2.40 -0.16 53.31 4.69  6.66  
Switzerland 10.51 1.94 2.02 52.74 10.31  9.96  
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics of All Variables 
This table presents the descriptive statistics (reported in Panel A) and Pearson correlation (reported in Panel B) of all variables.  
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. dev.   Min 0.25  Median 0.75  Max 
Spread 6,098 9.083 5.100 0.000 6.640 9.630 11.93 19.83 
Trust 6,098 0.393 0.078 0.065 0.392 0.392 0.392 0.750 
CGindicator 6,098 8.469 1.007 -3.221 8.283 8.310 8.527 11.80 
GDPgrowth 6,098 0.625 2.327 -10.89 -0.627 1.509 1.915 26.28 
Inflation 6,098 0.169 0.818 -25.25 -0.371 0.365 0.517 16.37 
DebtMkt 6,098 68.84 16.89 7.091 50.27 75.74 81.32 249.10 
Maturity 6,098 0.813 0.834 0.000 0.000 0.693 0.693 4.615 
Lisize 6,098 7.700 1.796 4.317 6.908 7.601 8.294 14.22 
Asset 6,098 14.38 1.061 7.847 14.62 14.66 14.70 14.90 
ROI 6,098 1.546 2.432 -10.42 0.623 1.814 1.940 12.71 
Leverage 6,098 34.21 11.45 14.38 27.15 34.50 39.23 88.61 
Risk 6,098 0.436 1.459 0.046 0.106 0.141 0.148 9.726 
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Panel B: Pearson Correlation. Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 Spread Trust CGindicator GDPgrowth Inflation DebtMkt Maturity Lisize Asset ROI Leverage Risk 
Spread 1                  
Trust -0.079*** 1           
CGindicator -0.002 0.544*** 1          
GDPgrowth -0.372*** 0.057*** 0.146*** 1         
Inflation 0.040*** -0.151*** 0.041*** 0.264*** 1        
DebtMkt -0.199*** -0.100*** -0.280*** 0.270*** -0.101*** 1       
Maturity -0.749*** 0.056*** -0.049*** 0.246*** -0.048*** 0.150*** 1      
Lisize -0.178*** 0.020 0.044*** 0.023* -0.032** -0.247*** 0.191*** 1      
Asset 0.163*** -0.437*** -0.031** -0.121*** 0.170*** 0.225*** -0.221*** -0.488*** 1    
ROI 0.048*** -0.450*** -0.302*** -0.118*** 0.090*** -0.118*** -0.053*** 0.020 0.151*** 1   
Leverage -0.019 0.581*** 0.115*** 0.091*** -0.027** -0.061*** 0.028** -0.010  -0.559*** -0.136*** 1  
Risk 0.011 0.516*** 0.153*** -0.027** -0.113*** -0.242*** 0.067*** 0.266*** -0.768*** -0.239*** 0.615*** 1 
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Table 4 
The Impact of Trust on the Cost of Debt Financing: Baseline Regression Estimates 
This table reports the OLS regression of trust on the cost of debt financing from 1996 to 2015. Each column 
reports estimates from a single regression, with robust standard errors clustered at the firm level in 
parentheses. Columns (1)–(2) report the full sample. Columns (3)–(4) and (5)–(6) only include the firms with 
a number of debt issues no more than 50 and 20 each year. All regressions control for both year and industry 
effects, and Columns (1), (3), and (5) also control for country effects. Note: ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 Full Sample Issues<=50 Issues<=20 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Trust -9.835** -7.139*** -8.311* -6.798** -9.692** -6.168** 
 (4.923) (1.745) (4.265) (2.700) (4.088) (2.938) 
CGindicator -0.403 0.101 -0.169 0.040 -0.017 0.072 
 (0.357) (0.086) (0.356) (0.101) (0.387) (0.107) 
GDPgrowth 0.182*** 0.150* 0.102** 0.067 0.129** 0.095* 
 (0.063) (0.076) (0.049) (0.064) (0.058) (0.051) 
Inflation 0.215*** 0.176*** 0.175** 0.155* 0.122 0.101 
 (0.079) (0.056) (0.086) (0.082) (0.084) (0.082) 
DebtMkt 0.014 0.010 0.043*** 0.010 0.046** 0.007 
 (0.018) (0.009) (0.016) (0.011) (0.018) (0.010) 
Maturity -4.055*** -4.081*** -1.673*** -2.122*** -0.890** -1.195** 
 (0.229) (0.209) (0.590) (0.516) (0.376) (0.469) 
Lisize -0.228*** -0.250*** -0.488*** -0.560*** -0.447** -0.584*** 
 (0.035) (0.042) (0.160) (0.126) (0.206) (0.211) 
Asset -0.284 -0.033 -0.279 0.243 -0.292 -0.011 
 (0.215) (0.246) (0.227) (0.286) (0.228) (0.194) 
ROI -0.031 -0.044 -0.109*** -0.057 -0.103*** -0.033 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.025) (0.054) (0.027) (0.063) 
Leverage -0.012 0.019 0.005 0.029 0.005 0.036 
 (0.022) (0.012) (0.020) (0.018) (0.020) (0.022) 
Risk 0.349*** 0.252*** 0.108 0.303*** 0.072 0.232** 
 (0.099) (0.080) (0.100) (0.089) (0.096) (0.108) 
Constant 17.594*** 15.591*** 13.684*** 12.816*** 12.346*** 12.841*** 
 (2.226) (2.434) (2.573) (3.695) (2.889) (3.837) 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Effects Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Observations 6,098 6,098 711 711 433 433 
R-squared 0.638 0.634 0.709 0.632 0.653 0.506 
  
 
40 
 
Table 5 
Country Governance and the Effect of Trust on the Cost of Debt Financing  
This table reports the OLS regressions in which Trust is interacted with CGIndicator and its sub-components. In order to avoid any 
multicollinearity issues, we exclude CGindicator in Columns (2)–(7), and only include each of the six dimensions of country 
governance and its interaction with Trust in those columns. Each column reports estimates from a single regression by including the 
same controls as reported in previous tables. To conserve space, we do not present controls. All regressions control for year, industry, 
and country effects. Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 CGIndicator Government 
Effectiveness 
(GE) 
Regulatory 
Quality  
(RQ) 
Control of 
Corruption 
(CC) 
Political 
Stability  
(PS) 
Rule of  
Law  
(RL) 
Voice and 
Accountability 
(VA) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Trust -33.894*** -31.077*** -19.922** -31.189*** -16.672*** -12.248 -36.215*** 
 (8.995) (10.484) (9.702) (9.362) (4.876) (9.167) (7.390) 
CGindicator -1.624***       
 (0.585)       
Trust*CGindicator 2.731***       
 (0.996)       
GE  -6.503**      
  (2.844)      
Trust*GE  12.420**      
  (5.541)      
RQ   -3.765     
   (3.235)     
Trust*RQ   5.945     
   (6.777)     
CC    -7.661***    
    (2.285)    
Trust*CC    12.653***    
    (4.432)    
PS     -3.643**   
     (1.826)   
Trust*PS     9.281**   
     (3.917)   
RL      -3.206  
      (2.890)  
Trust*RL      2.240  
      (5.592)  
VA       -8.434*** 
       (2.777) 
Trust*VA       20.799*** 
       (5.595) 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,098 6,098 6,098 6,098 6,098 6,098 6,098 
R-squared 0.638 0.638 0.638 0.639 0.638 0.638 0.638 
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Table 6 
The Financial Crisis and the Effect of Trust on the Cost of Debt Financing  
This table reports the OLS regressions in which Trust is interacted with a dummy variable 
FCrisis indicating the period of the recent financial crisis. FCrisis is equal to one if the year is 
between 2007 and 2009, and zero otherwise. Both regressions control year, industry effects, and 
Column (1) also controls for country effects. The estimate results are clustered at the firm level. 
Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 Spread Spread 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
Trust -8.434* -5.987** 
 (5.029) (2.369) 
CGindicator -0.344 0.080 
 (0.356) (0.095) 
FCrisis 5.543*** 4.168** 
 (1.380) (1.920) 
Trust*FCrisis -3.118** -2.259 
 (1.418) (1.930) 
GDPgrowth 0.224*** 0.193** 
 (0.058) (0.082) 
Inflation 0.219*** 0.179*** 
 (0.078) (0.055) 
DebtMkt 0.019 0.011 
 (0.017) (0.009) 
Maturity -4.053*** -4.080*** 
 (0.230) (0.210) 
Lisize -0.227*** -0.252*** 
 (0.036) (0.042) 
Asset -0.265 -0.009 
 (0.216) (0.248) 
ROI -0.043 -0.054 
 (0.034) (0.034) 
Leverage -0.010 0.019 
 (0.022) (0.012) 
Risk 0.328*** 0.275*** 
 (0.102) (0.077) 
Constant 16.928*** 14.835*** 
 (2.244) (2.460) 
Year Effects Yes Yes 
Industry Effects Yes Yes 
Country Effects Yes No 
Observations 6,098 6,098 
R-squared 0.638 0.634 
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Table 7 
Robustness Checks 
This table performs a variety of robustness checks. The estimate results are clustered at the firm level. 
Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Tobit Model. This panel re-runs estimations testing H1–H3 by employing the Tobit model 
proposed by James Tobin (Tobin, 1958).  
 H1 H2 H3 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
Trust -10.417** -33.315*** -4.999 
 (5.100) (9.771) (4.468) 
CGindicator -0.410 -1.572*** -0.612* 
 (0.360) (0.600) (0.315) 
Trust*CGindicator  2.599**  
  (1.066)  
FCrisis   5.181*** 
   (1.771) 
Trust*FCrisis   -7.916** 
   (3.425) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Year, Industry, and Country 
Observations 6,098 6,098 6,098 
Panel B: Reverse Causality. This panel re-runs estimations testing H1–H3 by employing the lagged value 
of trust, country governance indicator and the interaction terms. 
 H1 H2 H3 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
LagTrust -6.283* -26.776*** -6.864** 
 (3.591) (7.280) (3.262) 
LagCGindicator -0.077 -1.198** -0.348 
 (0.353) (0.504) (0.299) 
LagTrust*LagCGindicator  2.406***  
  (0.823)  
FCrisis   5.083*** 
   (1.861) 
LagTrust*FCrisis   -8.988* 
   (4.535) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Year, Industry, and Country 
Observations 6,098 6,098 6,098 
R-squared 0.638 0.638 0.638 
Panel C: Additional Robustness Checks. This panel re-runs estimations testing H1 by performing four 
additional robustness checks.  
VARIABLES Firm Fixed 
Effects 
(1) 
Higher Order Fixed 
Effects 
(2) 
Multicollinearity 
Issue 
(3) 
Credit 
Ratings 
(4) 
Trust -3.426*** -15.337*** -9.287* -11.253** 
 (1.039) (4.067) (5.027) (4.348) 
CGindicator -0.801*** -0.893**  -1.079*** 
 (0.233) (0.436)  (0.213) 
S&P Ratings    -0.449** 
    (0.219) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Firm Higher Order Year, Industry, and Country 
Observations 6,098 6,098 6,098 1,143 
R-squared 0.637 0.642 0.638 0.767 
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Highlights： 
1. We find that the level of societal trust in a country is negatively associated with the cost 
of debt financing. 
2. This effect is stronger in countries where the formal governance institutions are weaker. 
3. In addition, trust could mitigate the negative shock of financial crisis on the debt market. 
4. Overall, trust is an important social capital that is related to the financing cost. 
